......Then finally, came the day of them all.
The day we fans must never forget and keep in our minds for ever as we work hard on perfecting our hatred towards the corrupt member of the league.
The day we realized this season would officially go down in legend as a sham of football history.
The day we realized perhaps we were a great side, perhaps we were better than them, perhaps we could have stopped what they have all comspired to make them the continually most successful team in this country.
The 31st round of the league in this season. The day, the twenty-sixth of April, 1998, a date which will live in infamy.
Wednesday, April 26, 2006
Tuesday, February 28, 2006
Security of Love - The Berlin Wall
Security of love is a game with no beginning and no ending, no winner and no loser. It's a mistake to think that security is an achievable, fixed, static state. It's simply not possible to get security of love right once and for all, because the meaning of "right" is constantly changing. This situation has been with us since we humans started forming communities, and it's likely to be with us as long as we continue to be human.
An important precept is to expect both passive and active failures. No matter how good your countermeasure is, it will fail. And no matter how good your boyfriend is, he will break. These facts have been proven again and again throughout human history, and there's no reason to believe it will ever change. "Unbreakable," "absolute," and "impenetrable" are all words that make no sense when discussing love. If you hear them, you can be sure you're listening to someone who doesn't understand love or is trying to hoodwink you. Your boyfriend would remain loyal to you for 20 years before he sleeps with another girl. Good relationships are those in anticipation of possible failures. You can't win. You just make other girls' attacks as hard as possible, and contain the damage.
Consider this example: The Berlin Wall was one of the most secure systems ever built in human history. It has presented impressive series of countermeasures. As you read through the list, notice the defense in depth, the combination of prevention, detection, and response, and the overall resilience of the security system. From east to west, there were:
- 302 watchtowers, with armed East German guards.
- An initial barrier, either a 12-foot-all smooth concrete wall or a 10- to 13-foot-high wire-mesh fence. The wall was intermittently outfitted with some kind of electronic warning device.
- A field of steel stakes, planted in the ground, known as Stalin’s Grass.
- Barbed wire entanglements.
- 20 bunkers scattered along the perimeter.
- Hundreds of leashed guard dogs running alone a rail.
- A 20- to 50-foot strip of sand-covered earth, designed to reveal footprints of anyone crossing. This strip was also mined.
- A ditch, 10 to 16 feet deep, designed to stop any vehicles that got that far.
- A road with specially designed noiseless armed patrol vehicles.
- An electric fence six and a half feet high, outfitted with either acoustic or optical alarms.
- A narrow band of barren land, called the Death Strip.
- A final barrier, a concrete wall between 11.5 and 13 feet high. An asbestos cement tube topped this wall, designed to prevent escapes from grabbing hold of the top. This is the wall that was graffiti-covered on the Western side, the one featured on the nightly news worldwide.
Despite this interwoven system of protection, detection, and response, throughout its half-century history people tried numerous ways to attack it. Some flew over the wall. Some tunneled under it. Many died in the attempt, but thousands of people still managed to escape Eastern Europe. It's worth repeating: No countermeasure is perfect, unlimited in its capabilities, completely and permanently impervious to attack. No such countermeasure exists, and, I would argue, no such countermeasure will ever exist.
One last question still remains: Why did the people risk their life in an attempt to escape Eastern Europe? Perhaps this is the question that the designers of the Berlin Wall system never considered about. Perhaps this question was far beyond their knowledge, or they just simply didn't care. But everything must have a reason.
In some sense, it was again a "trade-off" problem. The people in Eastern Europe risked their life in exchange of something – the hope of a better life. On the other side of the Wall, they would have cars, they would have refrigerators, they would have TV sets, and most importantly, they would have freedom.
An important precept is to expect both passive and active failures. No matter how good your countermeasure is, it will fail. And no matter how good your boyfriend is, he will break. These facts have been proven again and again throughout human history, and there's no reason to believe it will ever change. "Unbreakable," "absolute," and "impenetrable" are all words that make no sense when discussing love. If you hear them, you can be sure you're listening to someone who doesn't understand love or is trying to hoodwink you. Your boyfriend would remain loyal to you for 20 years before he sleeps with another girl. Good relationships are those in anticipation of possible failures. You can't win. You just make other girls' attacks as hard as possible, and contain the damage.
Consider this example: The Berlin Wall was one of the most secure systems ever built in human history. It has presented impressive series of countermeasures. As you read through the list, notice the defense in depth, the combination of prevention, detection, and response, and the overall resilience of the security system. From east to west, there were:
- 302 watchtowers, with armed East German guards.
- An initial barrier, either a 12-foot-all smooth concrete wall or a 10- to 13-foot-high wire-mesh fence. The wall was intermittently outfitted with some kind of electronic warning device.
- A field of steel stakes, planted in the ground, known as Stalin’s Grass.
- Barbed wire entanglements.
- 20 bunkers scattered along the perimeter.
- Hundreds of leashed guard dogs running alone a rail.
- A 20- to 50-foot strip of sand-covered earth, designed to reveal footprints of anyone crossing. This strip was also mined.
- A ditch, 10 to 16 feet deep, designed to stop any vehicles that got that far.
- A road with specially designed noiseless armed patrol vehicles.
- An electric fence six and a half feet high, outfitted with either acoustic or optical alarms.
- A narrow band of barren land, called the Death Strip.
- A final barrier, a concrete wall between 11.5 and 13 feet high. An asbestos cement tube topped this wall, designed to prevent escapes from grabbing hold of the top. This is the wall that was graffiti-covered on the Western side, the one featured on the nightly news worldwide.
Despite this interwoven system of protection, detection, and response, throughout its half-century history people tried numerous ways to attack it. Some flew over the wall. Some tunneled under it. Many died in the attempt, but thousands of people still managed to escape Eastern Europe. It's worth repeating: No countermeasure is perfect, unlimited in its capabilities, completely and permanently impervious to attack. No such countermeasure exists, and, I would argue, no such countermeasure will ever exist.
One last question still remains: Why did the people risk their life in an attempt to escape Eastern Europe? Perhaps this is the question that the designers of the Berlin Wall system never considered about. Perhaps this question was far beyond their knowledge, or they just simply didn't care. But everything must have a reason.
In some sense, it was again a "trade-off" problem. The people in Eastern Europe risked their life in exchange of something – the hope of a better life. On the other side of the Wall, they would have cars, they would have refrigerators, they would have TV sets, and most importantly, they would have freedom.
Monday, February 27, 2006
Security of Love - The Countermeasures
Security of love is a tax on the honest.
If it weren't for attacks, our lives would be a whole lot easier. In a world where every boyfriend was completely honorable and faithful all of the time, and every other girl would have no interest to sleep with your boyfriend, everything you bought and did would be cheaper. You wouldn't have to pay for Swiss door locks, for instance. There would be no countermeasures, because your boyfriend would never consider going where he was not supposed to go or doing what he was not allowed to do. You wouldn't have to check his emails, SMS messages, phone records, or ICQ history. You wouldn't have to call him every 30mins to locate his positions. You wouldn't have to modify your behavior based on risks of your relationship, because there would be none.
But that's not the world we live in. Security of love permeates everything you do and supports your life in innumerable ways. Thus, you constantly making countermeasures (or trade-offs, I will go into details later), whether you're conscious of them or not: large and small, personal and social. All the countermeasures are, in some way, about prevention. But prevention of what, exactly? It is about preventing adverse consequences to your relationship from the intentional and unwarranted actions of others. (Note that: it concerns itself with intentional actions. Protecting your boyfriend from car accidents is safety, not security.)
"Trade-off" really is the right word to describe the countermeasures. Every one of us, every day of our lives, makes security trade-offs. When you brush your teeth in the morning, you're making a security trade-off: the time spent brushing in exchange for a small amount of security against tooth decay. When you lock your boyfriend in a house, you're making a trade-off: the inconvenience of carrying and using a key in exchange for some security against other girls. You call him every 30mins, you check his emails and ICQ messages, all these things you do, you are exchanging something to protect your relationship.
Unfortunately, many countermeasures are ineffective. Either they do not prevent adverse consequences to your relationship from the intentional and unwarranted actions of people, or the trade-offs simply aren't worth it. In general, countermeasures can fail in two completely different ways. The first way is that they can fail in the face of an attack. The door locks fail to keep your boyfriend inside, or your source in his company fails to feed you any information. These are passive failures: The countermeasure fails to take action when it should. A countermeasure can also fail by doing what it's supposed to do, but at the wrong time. The door locks keep you from entering your boyfriend’s house, or your source in his company feeds you false information. These are active failures: The countermeasure fails by taking action when it shouldn't.
In most of the cases, active failures are more frequent than passive failures. Countermeasures continually affect the normal functionality of your life, while they only occasionally affect attackers (other girls). This magnifies the effects of active failures, and the impact security systems have on the innocent. Countermeasures with passive failures are simply less effective: They only occasionally succeed in the face of an attack. Countermeasures with a relatively high rate of active failures are almost always more trouble than they're worth because of the high rate of false alarms.
Imagine a door lock that bars people from entering their own home. No matter how effective it is at stopping burglars, people would not tolerate it.
Nor would a faithful boyfriend who receives your location check every 30mins.
If it weren't for attacks, our lives would be a whole lot easier. In a world where every boyfriend was completely honorable and faithful all of the time, and every other girl would have no interest to sleep with your boyfriend, everything you bought and did would be cheaper. You wouldn't have to pay for Swiss door locks, for instance. There would be no countermeasures, because your boyfriend would never consider going where he was not supposed to go or doing what he was not allowed to do. You wouldn't have to check his emails, SMS messages, phone records, or ICQ history. You wouldn't have to call him every 30mins to locate his positions. You wouldn't have to modify your behavior based on risks of your relationship, because there would be none.
But that's not the world we live in. Security of love permeates everything you do and supports your life in innumerable ways. Thus, you constantly making countermeasures (or trade-offs, I will go into details later), whether you're conscious of them or not: large and small, personal and social. All the countermeasures are, in some way, about prevention. But prevention of what, exactly? It is about preventing adverse consequences to your relationship from the intentional and unwarranted actions of others. (Note that: it concerns itself with intentional actions. Protecting your boyfriend from car accidents is safety, not security.)
"Trade-off" really is the right word to describe the countermeasures. Every one of us, every day of our lives, makes security trade-offs. When you brush your teeth in the morning, you're making a security trade-off: the time spent brushing in exchange for a small amount of security against tooth decay. When you lock your boyfriend in a house, you're making a trade-off: the inconvenience of carrying and using a key in exchange for some security against other girls. You call him every 30mins, you check his emails and ICQ messages, all these things you do, you are exchanging something to protect your relationship.
Unfortunately, many countermeasures are ineffective. Either they do not prevent adverse consequences to your relationship from the intentional and unwarranted actions of people, or the trade-offs simply aren't worth it. In general, countermeasures can fail in two completely different ways. The first way is that they can fail in the face of an attack. The door locks fail to keep your boyfriend inside, or your source in his company fails to feed you any information. These are passive failures: The countermeasure fails to take action when it should. A countermeasure can also fail by doing what it's supposed to do, but at the wrong time. The door locks keep you from entering your boyfriend’s house, or your source in his company feeds you false information. These are active failures: The countermeasure fails by taking action when it shouldn't.
In most of the cases, active failures are more frequent than passive failures. Countermeasures continually affect the normal functionality of your life, while they only occasionally affect attackers (other girls). This magnifies the effects of active failures, and the impact security systems have on the innocent. Countermeasures with passive failures are simply less effective: They only occasionally succeed in the face of an attack. Countermeasures with a relatively high rate of active failures are almost always more trouble than they're worth because of the high rate of false alarms.
Imagine a door lock that bars people from entering their own home. No matter how effective it is at stopping burglars, people would not tolerate it.
Nor would a faithful boyfriend who receives your location check every 30mins.
Thursday, February 02, 2006
Security of Love
I write this article partly to correct some mistakes. Everyone needs security of love, but most of the people don't understand the problems and they don't understand the way to secure their relationships.
If you hide your boyfriend somewhere in Tin Shui Wai, remove his cell phone and lock him in a house with the finest Swiss door locks, then tell other girls to seduce him. That is not security. That is obscurity. On the other hand, if you put your boyfriend in LKF, let him surrounds himself by a hundred hot girls, allow him to flirt with them – and they still cannot sleep with him – that is security.
If the invulnerability of your relationship relies on the fact that other girls have no chance to touch your boyfriend, you are sunk. If you believe that keeping your boyfriend in a secret place improves the security of your relationship more than letting other girls to know him, you are wrong. And if you think that doing this then someone will never get your boyfriend, you are naïve. The most secure boyfriends you have are the ones made public, that they have been seduced for years, and are still unbreakable.
Security of love is both a feeling and a reality. We are secure when we feel that our relationship is protected from harm, free from dangers, and safe from attack. In this way, security is merely a state of mind. But there is the reality of security as well. The reality has nothing do with how we feel. Our relationship is secure when it is actually being protected. We need to feel in control and positive and not harried and fearful for security to have much of a positive effect on our relationship. But it is nonetheless important to ground that feeling of security in the reality of security, and not merely in placebos.
In some ways, this is analogous to health. If you went to the doctor because you had a badly damaged leg, she would not pretend that she could return your leg to its undamaged state if she couldn't. She would tell you the truth, describe your treatment options, and help you choose the one that is best for you, Ignoring reality is not an effective way to get healthier, or smarter, or safer, even though it might temporarily make you feel better.
Feeling and reality often contradict each other. In statistics there are type I and type II errors. Type I error: You feel that your boyfriend is faithful when he actually is not. Type II error: You feel that your boyfriend is unfaithful when he actually doesn't do anything wrong. Ironically, most of your friends would tell you to be careful of type I error, which causes you to make type II error as a consequence, and ultimately becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
To be continued...
If you hide your boyfriend somewhere in Tin Shui Wai, remove his cell phone and lock him in a house with the finest Swiss door locks, then tell other girls to seduce him. That is not security. That is obscurity. On the other hand, if you put your boyfriend in LKF, let him surrounds himself by a hundred hot girls, allow him to flirt with them – and they still cannot sleep with him – that is security.
If the invulnerability of your relationship relies on the fact that other girls have no chance to touch your boyfriend, you are sunk. If you believe that keeping your boyfriend in a secret place improves the security of your relationship more than letting other girls to know him, you are wrong. And if you think that doing this then someone will never get your boyfriend, you are naïve. The most secure boyfriends you have are the ones made public, that they have been seduced for years, and are still unbreakable.
Security of love is both a feeling and a reality. We are secure when we feel that our relationship is protected from harm, free from dangers, and safe from attack. In this way, security is merely a state of mind. But there is the reality of security as well. The reality has nothing do with how we feel. Our relationship is secure when it is actually being protected. We need to feel in control and positive and not harried and fearful for security to have much of a positive effect on our relationship. But it is nonetheless important to ground that feeling of security in the reality of security, and not merely in placebos.
In some ways, this is analogous to health. If you went to the doctor because you had a badly damaged leg, she would not pretend that she could return your leg to its undamaged state if she couldn't. She would tell you the truth, describe your treatment options, and help you choose the one that is best for you, Ignoring reality is not an effective way to get healthier, or smarter, or safer, even though it might temporarily make you feel better.
Feeling and reality often contradict each other. In statistics there are type I and type II errors. Type I error: You feel that your boyfriend is faithful when he actually is not. Type II error: You feel that your boyfriend is unfaithful when he actually doesn't do anything wrong. Ironically, most of your friends would tell you to be careful of type I error, which causes you to make type II error as a consequence, and ultimately becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
To be continued...
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